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Abstract
We report on an experiment designed to explore whether the effects of
expressing one’s emotions spill over into future interactions, thereby cur-
tailing subsequent selfish decisions. In between two identical public goods
games, participants play a binary-choice dictator game which, depending
on the treatment, either gives or does not give the recipient the oppor-
tunity to text the dictator. The recipients of an unfair offer—in contrast
to the recipients of a fair offer—contribute significantly less in the second
public goods game. Yet, their contribution reductions are significantly
smaller in the treatment allowing for recipient communication. To con-
trol for a belief-based explanation of these findings, we run treatments
where we elicit beliefs about the other’s contribution. We find that belief
elicitation affects the efficacy of communication.
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1 Introduction
People experience negative emotions when they feel cheated, or when their
partners do not live up to their expectations. Whether consciously or not, their
emotions often affect the way they act.1 Anger in particular tends to undermine
trust and the ability to work closely together (Jehn, 1995; Allred et al., 1997).
Previous experimental research indicates that the possibility to voice one’s
emotions influences behavior within a given game. More specifically, it has been
shown that if people are given the opportunity to express their disapproval of
the others’ choices, they reduce costly punishment in ultimatum games (Xiao
and Houser, 2005) and increase cooperation in public goods games (e.g., Ga¨chter
and Fehr, 1999; Masclet et al., 2003; Rege and Telle, 2004; Noussair and Tucker,
2005). This paper adds a dynamic element to the analysis of the effects of
communication opportunities: it investigates, through laboratory experiments,
whether allowing the voicing of negative emotions—even to just acknowledge
the other’s misbehavior—affects future instead of current levels of cooperation.2
Shedding light on this topic is important because if there are positive spillover
effects from “having a voice”, then the introduction of mechanisms designed to
encourage the communication of emotions could help to re-establish cooperative
attitudes among group members whose relations have become strained.
Work environments and personal relationships abound of examples where
the experience of negative emotions endangers future cooperation between the
involved parties. Co-authored papers, for instance, require effort by all par-
ticipating researchers, and the free riding behavior by one of them could deter
any form of collaboration with the free rider in the future. Although in real
life we avoid acting selfishly toward people we know we are going to repeatedly
interact with, it is undeniable that sometimes we do act in a self-interested way
and hurt our partners, thereby triggering negative emotions in them. Actually,
in our experiment, the participants are not aware that they will interact again
with the same person at a later stage (although they know from the outset that
the experiment consists of several stages). This resembles situations where, e.g.,
we would wish not to work again with colleagues that shirked in the past their
responsibilities, but are forced to do so by external circumstances, such as a
1Elster (1998) provides a comprehensive survey study of the relationship between emotions
and decision making. Battigalli et al. (2015) formally illustrate how anger and frustration
shape social and economic interactions.
2We acknowledge that different negative emotions generate different behavioral predictions
(see, e.g., Lerner and Keltner, 2000). However, determining which specific emotion (anger,
resentment, irritation, or contempt) is experienced by our participants is beyond the scope of
this study. Thus, we refer to negative emotions in general terms.
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request from our principal.
Our approach involves letting participants play three games in the follow-
ing order: a two-person public goods game, a binary-choice dictator game (or
‘mini dictator game’), and one more public goods game that is identical to the
first one. Following the standard practice in experimental economics (aimed at
avoiding potential experimenter demand effects; see Zizzo, 2010), participants
are informed from the outset that they will go through three stages and that
they will learn about the content of each stage upon completion of the previous
one. Pairs are reshuffled only between the first public goods game and the mini
dictator game.3 The dictator has to choose between a fair and an unfair of-
fer. Participants do not receive any feedback on the outcome of the first public
goods game until the second public goods game is completed,4 while recipients
are immediately informed about the outcome of the mini dictator game. The
latter serves as a device for inducing, in the laboratory, negative emotions on
the part of the recipients who have been treated unfairly. Such emotions could
urge them to retaliate against selfish dictators (e.g., Nelissen and Zeelenberg,
2009; Clavien and Klein, 2010). We analyze the consequences of negative emo-
tions on future cooperation by comparing the changes in contributions of the
recipients who receive the unfair offer to the changes in contributions of the
recipients who receive the fair offer. We assess the spillover effects of commu-
nication by comparing how the contributions of the unfairly treated recipients
change in two different treatments: a treatment with a standard mini dictator
game, and another treatment with a mini dictator game where the recipient,
having learned of the dictator’s allocation choice, is allowed to send him a text
message.
Our analysis differs from existing work investigating the effects of ex post
recipient communication in dictator games. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008)
and Xiao and Houser (2009) focus on the dictator’s behavior and report that
the prospect of verbal feedback motivates him to be fair. Conversely, we mainly
look at the behavior of the other party, namely the recipient that got “justifiably
angry” (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008, p. 101).5
3Since participants do not know in advance what the final stage will be, they are unaware
of the fact that they will interact with the same person in the second public goods game. It
may be claimed that this kind of incomplete information (to the extent that it is altering the
participants’ behavior by inducing them to be more selfish) constitutes deception by omission
(see Krawczyk, 2013). While we cannot avoid possible misinterpretations on the part of the
participants—that is the expectation of a new reshuffling of the pairs between the mini dictator
game and the second public goods game—we worded the general instructions distributed at
the outset in such a way that they could not possibly suggest such a reshuffling.
4This design feature prevents participants from experiencing, during the course of the
experiment, emotions based on interaction in the first game.
5In a similar vein, Houser et al. (2012) analyze the behavior of recipients who were treated
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Our conjecture is that, compared to recipients with no option of communi-
cation, recipients who can express themselves via symbolic gestures reduce their
contributions less in the subsequent public goods game. In our experiment, two
mechanisms can account for the spillover effects of messaging opportunities.
Firstly, people may inherently value the chance to express their opinions (Katz,
1960; Ong et al., 2012), which does not necessarily mean using strong language.
For instance, Tyler et al. (1985) find that the possibility to voice one’s views
heightens the feeling of justice and improves outcome satisfaction even when
voice has no impact on outcomes. People often feel relief and satisfaction just
because they can talk to the person who harmed them. Although never explic-
itly tested, it is conceivable that the relief of negative feelings associated with
the opportunity to state one’s case spreads to future interactions. In experimen-
tal studies manipulating mood states, the induction of a positive mood—via,
e.g., film clips—has been found to increase people’s generosity (Carlson et al.,
1988; Isen, 2000; Kirchsteiger et al., 2006).
The second mechanism through which messaging opportunities may affect
subsequent decisions is that they raise the recipient’s expectations about the
contribution of a selfish dictator in the second public goods game. An unfair
offer in the mini dictator game could, indeed, lead the recipient to believe (once
he has learned about the content of the final game) that the dictator, being
selfish, will contribute nothing or very little in the second public goods game.
If the recipient is a conditional cooperator (i.e., he contributes an amount that
he thinks will be similar to the other’s contribution; see Fischbacher et al., 2001;
Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010) who has contributed a non-trivial amount in
the first public goods game, he himself will contribute nothing or very little
in the second public goods game, thereby reducing his own contribution. Yet,
since verbal feedback may be expected to cause the dictator guilt or shame
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Xiao and Houser, 2009), the conditionally
cooperative recipient may believe that the dictator will be more generous upon
receipt of a message. Such a recipient will therefore reduce his contribution less
in the presence than in the absence of messaging opportunities. To test for this
belief-based explanation of the spillover effects of communication, we conduct
treatments where we elicit subjects’ beliefs about the other’s contribution in
the public goods games.
The evidence that we collected indicates that the recipients who receive the
unfair offer in the mini dictator game, but not those who receive the fair one,
tend to reduce their contributions in the final game. This difference can be
unfairly with the aim of assessing whether perceived unfairness relates to cheating behavior.
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explained by the fact that recipients are conditional cooperators and expect
the selfish (generous) dictators to contribute little (a fairly large amount) in
the second public goods game. The observed reductions in the unfairly treated
recipients’ subsequent contributions are significantly smaller when these recipi-
ents are given the chance to send a text message to the dictators, but only in the
treatments without belief elicitation. Incentivized belief elicitation is therefore
found to affect the efficacy of communication.6 When, as a robustness check of
this result, we restrict the sample to the unfairly treated recipients who actually
reduce their contributions, we observe that communication opportunities have
a significant effect on how contributions change also in the presence of belief
elicitation. A belief-based explanation for this latter finding is not supported
by our data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the games that
constitute the basis of our experimental design. Section 3 is devoted to the
design itself: it describes our treatments, states our research questions, and
provides details on the employed experimental procedures. Section 4 reports
our experimental results. Section 5 summarizes the main points of the study
and offers concluding remarks.
2 The games
Each of our experimental sessions consists of a succession of three games: the
first and third games are identical linear public goods games; the second game
is a mini dictator game. Each participant therefore plays the final public goods
game having acted as either a dictator or a recipient in the mini dictator game.
We will refer to the participants as “dictators” or “recipients” depending on
their role in the mini dictator game.
2.1 The mini dictator game
At the beginning of the mini dictator game (henceforth MDG) the participants
are paired at random. Then the computer randomly determines, with equal
probability, which pair member will act as the dictator. The dictator is offered
e20 and the choice between two alternative allocations. The first one entails
keeping e18 for himself and giving e2 to the recipient. The second allocation
favors the recipient, albeit slightly; it gives e9 to the dictator and e11 to the
recipient. We preferred this second allocation to the equal split so as to tempt
6Previous studies have shown that eliciting incentivized beliefs can significantly influence
behavior (Croson, 2000; Ga¨chter and Renner, 2010).
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the dictators with the selfish decision and obtain a larger sample of recipients
supposedly experiencing negative emotions after having received just e2.7
2.2 The two-person linear public goods game
To study the effect of messaging on future levels of cooperation, we rely on
two identical linear public goods games, one played before the MDG and the
other played immediately after the MDG. The first public goods game is the
yardstick of the participants’ cooperative attitudes.
In each public goods game (henceforth PGG), participants interact in pairs.
Each pair member is endowed with e14 that he can either consume privately
or contribute to the public good. Indicating a PGG by g, where g = 1, 2, and
denoting the contribution of member i (i = 1, 2) in g by cgi , where 0 ≤ c
g
i ≤ 14,
i’s monetary payoff in each g is given by:
π
g
i = (14− c
g
i ) + 0.75 (c
g
1 + c
g
2) ∀ i.
Since the marginal per capita return is less than unity, the dominant strategy for
a monetary payoff maximizer is to contribute nothing. If both pair members
free rode, then each one of them would earn e14. On the other hand, the
socially efficient outcome is to contribute everything. If both pair members
made the socially efficient choice, then each one of them would earn e21.
3 The experimental design
3.1 Treatments and research questions
The design manipulates two factors in a complete factorial design. The first
factor refers to whether or not the recipient in the MDG—after being informed
of his payoff—has the opportunity to send a written message to the dictator
he is paired with. The second factor refers to whether or not beliefs about
the other’s contribution are elicited in the two PGGs. The characteristics of
our treatments are summarized in Table 1. Each treatment is labeled with a
sequence of letters. The first letter indicates whether or not the MDG allows for
messaging opportunities (C stands for “control” and M for “message”). The
remaining letter(s) indicate(s) whether or not beliefs are elicited in the PGGs
(nB stands for “no beliefs” and B for “beliefs”).
7Gu¨th et al. (2001), for example, report that proposers in ultimatum games choose more
often the unfair offer when the equal split is replaced by a nearly equal split that favors the
responder. Charness and Rabin (2002) also show that people in allocation games avoid acts
of generosity that result in being paid less than the others.
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Table 1: Summary of experimental design.
Treatment Recipients may send a message Elicitation of beliefs in PGGs
CnB no no
MnB yes no
CB no yes
MB yes yes
As explained in Section 2.1, in the MDG of each treatment, the dictator
chooses between two alternative allocations of e20. In the treatments with
messaging opportunities (i.e., MnB and MB), each recipient—after viewing
the offer—may text the dictator he is paired with; in the control treatments
(i.e., CnB and CB), the recipient has no such possibility. These treatments
are designed to shed light on the following questions:
Question 1 Do the differences in contributions between the first and the second
PGG (if any) depend on whether the recipients get e2 or e11 in the
MDG?
Question 2 Do the recipients of e2 reduce (if at all) their contributions from
the first to the second PGG less when they are allowed to send the dictators
a message in comparison to when they have no such option?
We address Question 1 by comparing, in all treatments, the differences
in contributions between the first and the second PGG (that is c1i − c
2
i ) for
the recipients of e2 to the same differences for the recipients of e11. We
address Question 2 by comparing, for the recipients of e2, the differences in
contributions between the first and the second PGG in each control treatment to
the same differences in the corresponding message treatment. More formally, we
compare c1i − c
2
i in CnB (CB) to c
1
i − c
2
i in MnB (MB), where i is restricted
to the sample of unfairly treated recipients. We refer to the differences in
contributions between the first and the second PGG as “contribution changes.”
Whenever these differences are positive, we talk of “contribution cuts.”
As mentioned in Section 2.2, in both PGGs of each treatment, each pair
member needs to decide how many out of e14 he wishes to contribute to the
public good. In the treatments with belief elicitation (i.e., CB and MB), each
pair member—after making his contribution decision—has one more task to
perform: he must report what he expects his partner to contribute. We gave
participants a financial incentive to report beliefs accurately. We paid them e3
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for a belief that turned out to be correct, e2 for a belief that differed no more
than one unit from the other’s actual contribution, and nothing in all other
cases. Incentives in the belief task were kept small relative to incentives in the
contribution task in order to avoid hedging.8
Treatments CB and MB let us control for a belief-based explanation of
the answers to Questions 1 and 2. Concerning Question 1, in comparison with
the recipients of e11, the recipients of e2 may contribute (even) less in the
second PGG in relation to the first one because they feel unfairly treated and
experience negative emotions or because they are conditional cooperators and
take the dictator’s action as a signal of selfishness. Lower contributions in
the second than in the first PGG cannot be ascribed to the outcome of the
first PGG because participants do not receive feedback on this until the end of
the experiment; nor can they be attributed to a desire to reestablish equality
because participants (know that they) are paid according to their decisions in
one game only so that income effects from the MDG can be excluded. As to
Question 2, the reductions in the unfairly treated recipients’ contributions could
be smaller when messaging is permitted not only if messaging has a value in
itself (Tyler et al., 1985; Ong et al., 2012), but also if it affects a conditionally
cooperative recipient’s beliefs about the dictator’s future contribution in the
sense that a message is expected to promote a feeling of guilt or shame in
its receiver and consequently prompt him to act pro-socially (Ellingsen and
Johannesson, 2008; Xiao and Houser, 2009).
We run treatments with and without belief elicitation in the two PGGs as
there is evidence that eliciting beliefs—and, in particular, incentivizing belief
elicitation—affects contribution decisions, although the direction of the effect is
not clear in the literature (see, e.g., Croson, 2000; Ga¨chter and Renner, 2010).
The treatments with belief elicitation allow us to answer the following two
questions:
Question 3 Do unfair offers by the dictators serve as a signal of selfishness so
that recipients who get e2 in the MDG expect their second PGG partner to
contribute less than their first PGG partner and as a consequence (being
conditional cooperators) lower their own contributions?
Question 4 Do unfairly treated recipients, acting in the belief that their mes-
sage will induce dictators to cooperate more, reduce their expectations of
their partners’ contributions less when they can send a message in com-
parison to when they are not allowed to do so?
8Blanco et al. (2010) show that hedging is not an issue in one-shot sequential prisoner’s
dilemma experiments insofar as the incentives to hedge are neither strong nor prominent.
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We address Question 3 by comparing, for the recipients who get e2, their
beliefs in the first PGG to their beliefs in the second PGG, and testing whether
changes in beliefs are associated with analogous changes in contributions. We
address Question 4 by comparing how the recipients who get e2 change their
beliefs from the first to the second PGG in treatments CB and MB; formally,
denoting i’s beliefs in game g by bgi (where i = 1, 2 and g = 1, 2), we compare
b1i − b
2
i in CB to b
1
i − b
2
i in MB.
3.2 Procedures
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted
in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics (Jena,
Germany). The participants, undergraduate students from the Friedrich Schiller
University of Jena, were recruited using Greiner’s (2015) ORSEE software.
They had never participated before in either a social dilemma experiment or a
dictator game experiment.
We used a between-subjects design, i.e., each subject was exposed to only
one of the four treatments. Overall, we ran twenty-three sessions with a total
of 716 participants. The fourteen sessions devoted to the CnB and MnB
treatments (with 30 to 32 participants per session) took place from the 7th of
September 2011 to the 5th of December 2011; those devoted to the CB and
MB treatments (with 24 to 32 participants per session) were run one year later,
from the 12th of November to the 3th of December 2012.
In each session, each of the three games was presented separately at a differ-
ent stage of the experiment.9 Although participants knew from the beginning
that there would be three stages, each participant learned about the content
of each stage only after having completed the previous one.10 All games were
run one-shot. We implemented a stranger matching protocol between the first
PGG and the MDG, and a partner matching protocol between the MDG and
the second PGG. We cannot rule out the possibility that some dictators be-
haved selfishly in the MDG under the (false) impression that they would not
be rematched with the same person in the final game. However, nothing in
the general instructions distributed at the outset indicated that there would be
such a rematching. In fact, the general instructions did not give any hint about
the content of the third stage, which from the participants’ perspective could
9The full sequence of events is set out in Appendix A in the Online Supplement. The
latter also contains (see Appendix D) a translation of the instructions (originally in German)
for the MB treatment.
10Besides minimizing experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010), this design feature pre-
vents the recipients from using the text message to communicate how the dictator should
behave in the final public goods game.
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have been an individual decision-making setting or any other setting that does
not require cooperation (e.g., a voting game). We are therefore confident that
there was no deception by omission (Krawczyk, 2013) in our experiment.
In treatments MnB and MB, each recipient was given four minutes to type
his message in a text box, but it was at his discretion to send it ahead of the
deadline. The form of the message was free; the only restriction to its content
was that its sender could not identify himself. The dictator knew that the
recipient would have the possibility to send a message.
To minimize path dependence between the two PGGs (i.e., the dependence
of choices in the second PGG on outcomes in the first PGG), as well as learn-
ing effects (see Andreoni, 1988), subjects received feedback about the other’s
contribution and their own payoff in the first PGG only after having completed
the second PGG. To avoid income effects, one of the three games was chosen
at random and subjects were paid according to their decisions in that game
(subjects knew about this procedure since the beginning of the session).
In all treatments, after interaction in the second public goods game, we had
recipients report the emotion, if any, they experienced when they found out
the dictator’s decision. Recipients had to select one among the following eleven
emotions: pride, envy, anger, happiness, shame, irritation, gratitude, surprise,
contempt, admiration, or none.11
Each experimental session lasted about an hour. Averaging over all sessions,
mean earnings amounted to e17.85 (inclusive of a e2.5 show-up fee).
4 Experimental results
4.1 Assessing the quality of randomization across comparable treatments
First, we discuss the extent to which participants were assigned to treatments in
a representative way.12 Figure 1 draws, separately for each treatment, boxplots
of all subjects’ contribution choices in the two PGGs (PGG 1 refers to the
first public goods game and PGG 2 to the second, the × symbol denotes the
mean). With unbiased recruitment, it should not be possible to reject the null
hypothesis that the PGG 1 contributions in treatments CnB and MnB, as well
as in treatments CB and MB, have identical distributions. Wilcoxon rank sum
tests indicate that this is indeed the case (p-value = 0.62 for CnB vs. MnB,
11 Averaging across all treatments, 69% of the recipients who got e2 did select a negative
emotion. The list contains both negative and positive emotions for two reasons: (i) we did
not want to push participants in a particular direction; (ii) we expected recipients getting e11
to report a positive emotion.
12Unless otherwise stated, all statistical tests presented in this section are two-sided.
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Figure 1: Boxplots of contributions in the first and the second public goods
game (PGG 1 and PGG 2, respectively) per treatment.
0.27 for CB vs. MB). We can therefore conclude that randomization worked
when comparing PGG 1 contributions between treatments that manipulate the
presence versus absence of messaging opportunities.
In line with the results of Ga¨chter and Renner (2010), contributions are
larger in the treatments with incentivized belief elicitation than in the no-belief
treatments; the difference is significant for the comparison between CnB and
CB, but not for the comparison between MnB and MB (p-values equal 0.01
and 0.30, respectively; Wilcoxon rank sum test).
Table 2 categorizes our subjects according to their role and earnings in
the MDG and reports the average contribution of each category in each of
the two PGGs (the relative frequencies and further descriptive statistics of the
contributions can be found in Figure C1 in the Online Supplement).
We examine whether recipients of e2—the main object of our analysis—
differ in their contributions to the first public good across treatments. Accord-
ing to Table 2, these contributions average 6.31 (7.21) in CnB (CB) and 5.79
(7.03) in MnB (MB). No significant difference is detected between either CnB
and MnB (p-value = 0.53; Wilcoxon rank sum test) or CB and MB (p-value
= 0.67). Additionally, there is no significant difference between pairs of treat-
ments that differ only with respect to belief elicitation (p-value equals 0.21 for
CnB vs. CB and 0.11 for MnB vs. MB; Wilcoxon rank sum test). Hence, the
unfairly treated recipients are sufficiently homogeneous in terms of cooperative
attitudes across comparable treatments.13
13The significant difference in the PGG 1 contributions between CnB and CB that we
detected earlier at the population level is attributable to the dictators who contribute signifi-
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Table 2: Average contribution in the two PGGs, separately for each type of participant and each treatment.
CnB treatment MnB treatment CB treatment MB treatment
Na PGG 1 PGG 2 N PGG 1 PGG 2 N PGG 1 PGG 2 N PGG 1 PGG 2
All participants 222 5.95 4.71 220 6.19 6.28 154 6.92 6.32 120 6.55 6.15
⊲ Recipients 111 6.35 4.32 110 6.20 6.24 77 6.58 5.99 60 6.79 6.11
¬ Getting e2 82 6.31 3.06 64 5.79 4.45 47 7.21 5.48 42 7.03 5.30
− with c2i < c
1
i 44 7.76 1.26 26 6.10 2.00 25 7.62 3.37 27 6.27 3.23
− with c1i = c
2
i 31 4.53 4.53 32 5.50 5.50 16 7.34 7.34 12 8.79 8.79
− with c2i > c
1
i 7 5.10 7.87 6 5.92 9.50 6 5.15 9.30 3 6.83 10.00
¬ Getting e11 29 6.46 7.88 46 6.77 8.73 30 5.59 6.79 18 6.23 7.99
⊲ Dictators 111 5.55 5.10 110 6.19 6.31 77 7.27 6.66 60 6.30 6.18
¬ Keeping e18 82 4.62 3.88 64 4.84 4.63 47 7.11 6.09 42 5.53 5.08
− with c2i < c
1
i 27 6.33 3.02 19 5.50 2.91 22 7.37 3.63 13 7.60 4.25
− with c1i = c
2
i 42 3.62 3.62 34 4.85 4.85 15 8.00 8.00 18 4.22 4.22
− with c2i > c
1
i 13 4.28 6.54 11 3.68 6.95 10 5.18 8.62 11 5.24 7.46
¬ Keeping e9 29 8.17 8.53 46 8.07 8.65 30 7.52 7.55 18 8.11 8.77
a N stands for the number of subjects in each category.
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4.2 Spillover effects of messaging opportunities
In what follows we provide an answer to our first two research questions. As
to Question 1 (asking whether the recipients of e2 and e11 differ with re-
spect to their contribution changes), Table 2 shows that, whatever treatment
we consider, the recipients of e2 (e11) contribute, on average, substantially
less (more) in the second PGG than in the first one. In all treatments, the con-
tribution changes are significant for both types of recipients (p-value < 0.02 for
all comparisons and irrespective of the amount got by the recipient; Wilcoxon
signed rank test), and so is the difference in contribution changes between the
recipients getting e2 and the recipients getting e11 (p-value < 0.01 for all
comparisons; Wilcoxon rank sum test).14 These results provide an affirmative
answer to Question 1 and allow us to state:
Result 1 In all treatments, the recipients who get e2 contribute significantly
less in the second PGG than in the first one, whereas those who get e11
contribute significantly more.
Question 2 asks whether the contribution changes of the recipients getting
e2 are affected by the possibility of sending a message. Table 2 suggests that
it is only when beliefs are not elicited that these recipients reduce their con-
tributions to a smaller extent in the treatments with messaging opportunities
than in the control treatments (c1i − c
2
i equals, on average, 1.34 in MnB and
3.25 in CnB; c1i − c
2
i equals 1.73 in both MB and CB). There is a significant
difference in contribution changes between CnB and MnB (p-value = 0.03,
one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test), but not between CB and MB (p-value =
0.65). Thus messaging opportunities have spillover effects in the absence, but
not in the presence, of incentivized belief elicitation.
Compared to the unfairly treated recipients who either do not change or even
increase their contributions, the unfairly treated recipients who reduce their
contributions presumably appreciate more the introduction of communication
opportunities. Returning to the example of co-authored papers given in the
Introduction, it is exactly when we do not wish to work again with colleagues
who shirked in the past their responsibilities that the need for communication
is felt more urgently and the possibility of communication could prove decisive
cantly different amounts in these two treatments (p-value < 0.01, Wilcoxon rank sum test; as
to the remaining pairwise comparisons, the p-values are 0.40 for CnB vs. MnB, 0.11 for CB
vs. MB, and 0.64 for MnB vs. MB).
14Since the recipients who get e11 increase their contributions from the first to the second
PGG, it is clear that the subsequent lower contributions of the unfairly treated recipients
cannot be attributed to learning how to play the free riding equilibrium (in the sense of
Andreoni, 1988).
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in helping us to change our mind and eventually start a new collaboration.
Hence, as a robustness check, we repeat the above analysis restricting this
time our sample to the unfairly treated recipients who actually reduce their
contributions (i.e., recipients with c2i < c
1
i ). One-sided Wilcoxon rank sum
tests show now that the difference in contribution cuts is significant at the 5%
level for the comparison CnB vs. MnB (p-value = 0.04) and at the 10% level
for the comparison CB vs. MB (p-value = 0.08).15 We summarize the results
on Question 2 as follows:
Result 2 Messaging opportunities reduce contribution cuts significantly in all
treatments if we consider the subsample of unfairly treated recipients who
reduce their contributions. With respect to the entire sample of recipients
of e2, significant spillover effects of messaging opportunities are confined
to the treatments without belief elicitation.
4.3 Analysis of the elicited beliefs
We now turn to the analysis of the elicited beliefs in order to (i) investigate
whether recipients of e2 behave as if they were conditional cooperators, and
(ii) assess whether it is conditional cooperation or the possibility of “having a
voice” per se that accounts for the spillover effects of messaging opportunities
observed for all recipients of e2 in the treatments without belief elicitation, and
for the subsample of unfairly treated recipients who reduce their contributions
in all treatments. Table 3 provides the means and standard deviations of the
elicited beliefs per type of participant and treatment.
Starting from the first part of Question 3 (asking whether the dictators’
unfair offers signal selfishness to the recipients), in both treatments with belief
elicitation the recipients of e2 expect from their partners significantly smaller
contributions in the second PGG than in the first one (p-value < 0.01 for both
CB and MB; Wilcoxon signed rank test). The opposite holds for the recipients
of e11; they expect higher contributions in the second PGG than in the first
one, albeit significantly so only in the CB treatment (p-value < 0.01 for CB
and p-value = 0.32 for MB; Wilcoxon signed rank test). The null hypothesis
that, in the second PGG, there is no difference in stated beliefs between the
recipients getting e2 and the recipients getting e11 can be rejected (p-value
= 0.048 for CB and 0.03 for MB; Wilcoxon rank sum test). Consequently,
15The percentage of unfairly treated recipients who do not change or increase their subse-
quent contributions in CB (46.81%) compared to MB (35.71%) may explain the finding of
non-significant difference that we detected at the population level.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of elicited beliefs, separately for each type of
participant and each treatment.
CB MB
PGG 1 PGG 2 PGG 1 PGG 2
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
All participants 7.21 3.18 5.96 3.86 6.26 3.24 5.50 3.95
⊲ Recipients 6.84 3.33 6.33 3.73 6.60 3.12 5.75 3.66
¬ Getting e2 7.65 3.41 5.78 3.90 6.53 2.95 5.01 3.28
¬ Getting e11 5.57 2.80 7.20 3.33 6.78 3.57 7.46 4.02
⊲ Dictators 7.58 3.01 5.59 3.96 5.92 3.35 5.25 4.24
¬ Keeping e18 7.24 3.06 4.15 3.50 5.29 3.05 3.67 3.62
¬ Keeping e9 8.10 2.89 7.86 3.61 7.39 3.63 8.94 3.18
recipients do take a selfish action in the MDG as a sign that their partner will
be selfish in the future.
Concerning the second part of Question 3 (asking whether the behavior
of the unfairly treated recipients is consistent with conditional cooperation),
we note that the unfairly treated recipients’ changes in the amount they expect
their partners to contribute are positively and significantly correlated with their
own contribution changes (τ = 0.36 with p-value < 0.01 for CB and τ = 0.62
with p-value < 0.01 for MB; Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient). These
results indicate that we can answer Question 3 affirmatively, that is:
Result 3 Unfair offers in the MDG serve as a signal of selfishness and the
way the unfairly treated recipients adjust their contributions from the first
to the second PGG is consistent with their belief changes, in other words
they behave as if they were conditional cooperators.
Conditional cooperation appears to be a likely explanation of behavior also
for the favorably treated recipients as the increase in their beliefs about the
other’s contribution is positively correlated with the increase in their own con-
tribution (Kendall’s τ between b2i − b
1
i and c
2
i − c
1
i equals 0.46, with a p-value
less than 0.01, for CB and 0.41, with a p-value of 0.02, for MB).
As to Question 4 (asking whether unfairly treated recipients reduce their
expectations of their partners’ contributions less in the presence of messaging
opportunities), a one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test comparing b1i − b
2
i in CB
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to b1i − b
2
i in MB does not confirm that the recipients of e2 reduce their contri-
bution expectations to a smaller extent when they are given the opportunity to
write a message to their partners (p-value = 0.60). The same holds if we restrict
our attention to the unfairly treated recipients with decreasing contributions (p-
value = 0.72 by the same test). It appears that the latter substantially reduce
their contribution cuts in the presence of messaging opportunities even if they
do not believe that the selfish type of player they are paired with will become
less uncooperative (because of their message) in the subsequent interaction.
Result 4 The unfairly treated recipients do not reduce their expectations of
their partners’ contributions less when they can send a message in com-
parison to when they are not allowed to do so.
The increase in contribution expectations of the recipients who get e11 is
higher when messaging is not permitted: the mean of b2i − b
1
i equals 1.63 in CB
and 0.68 in MB, but the difference is not significant (p-value = 0.54, Wilcoxon
rank sum test).
4.4 Self-reported emotions and the messages’ content
Table 4 presents, separately for the recipients who got e2 and the recipients
who got e11, the results of the post-experimental questionnaire, that is how
the recipients described their own feelings upon learning the dictator’s decision.
Most of the unfairly treated recipients self-reported the feeling of a negative
emotion; the exact percentages per treatment are as follows: 69.5% in CnB,
68.8% in MnB, 72.3% in CB, and 64.3% in MB.16 The percentage of those
claiming to have felt no emotion (that is “none” in the classification of Table 4)
ranges from 14.9% in CB to 26.2% in MB. Very few unfairly treated recipients
(3.7% in CnB, 6.3% in MnB, 2.1% in CB, and 0.0% in MB) reported a positive
emotion. Overall, 73 out of the 235 recipients getting e2 (i.e., 31.1%) did not
report a negative emotion. We note that the results presented above for the
entire sample do not qualitatively change if we exclude these 73 recipients from
the analysis. The only difference is that the result of the one-sided Wilcoxon
rank sum test investigating whether messaging opportunities lead to smaller
contribution changes (our Question 2) is significant at the 10% level for the
CnB vs. MnB comparison (p-value = 0.09).
Table 5 classifies the messages written by both types of recipients on the
basis of their emotional content (the methodological details are given in Ap-
16Similarly, between 69.0% and 88.9% of the recipients that were offered e11 self-reported
the feeling of a positive emotion.
16
Table 4: Relative frequencies of the recipients’ self-reported emotions.
Emotion
recipients getting e2 recipients getting e11
CnB MnB CB MB CnB MnB CB MB
Anger 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Irritation 0.44 0.33 0.51 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Contempt 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Envy 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Shame 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Surprise 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.28 0.17 0.20 0.11
None 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.26 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00
Happiness 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.17 0.37 0.06
Gratitude 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.43 0.20 0.44
Admiration 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.09 0.20 0.28
Pride 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.11
Note: The first (last) four emotions are negative (positive), the remaining three emotions
are neutral.
Table 5: Message classification in the two treatments with messaging oppor-
tunities.
Negative Neutral Positive
Treatment MnB
recipients getting e2 0.35 0.59 0.06
recipients getting e11 0.02 0.00 0.98
Treatment MB
recipients getting e2 0.52 0.43 0.05
recipients getting e11 0.00 0.11 0.89
Note: In MnB (MB), 64 (42) recipients received e2 and 46 (18) recipients received e11.
In each treatment, one recipient with e2 did not send any message.
pendix B in the Online Supplement). In each of the two treatments with mes-
saging opportunities, all recipients except one sent a message to their dictators.
In treatment MnB, 63 messages were written by recipients receiving the unfair
offer; 35% of them were classified as expressing negative emotions and the ma-
jority (namely 59%) as expressing neutral emotions. In all but a few neutral
messages, the recipient did rebuke the dictator for his choice, but also confessed
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that he would not have acted differently had the right of choice been given to
him. For example, one such neutral message refers to the dictator’s choice as
stupid: “I cannot do anything else but accept your choice. I find it stupid that
you did not give me more, but I would have acted the same way.” And another
message classified as neutral says: “Hi Mr./Mrs. Unknown, I pity you for your
choice, but probably I would have done the same.” The frequency of this kind
of neutral message is lower in treatment MB, where 52% of the 41 messages
written by the recipients getting e2 are classified as expressing negative emo-
tions.17 Only 6% (5%) recipients getting e2 in MnB (MB) sent a message
that was classified as showing positive emotional content.
With regard to the messages written by recipients getting e11, 98% (89%)
of them were classified in MnB (MB) as having positive content.
As a final remark, we note that our results rely on the assumption that
the unfairly treated recipients felt negative emotions. We strongly believe that
the recipients’ self-reported emotions provide more accurate information about
their emotional state as compared to the classification of the messages’ content
because, in the words of Xiao and Houser (2005, p. 7401), such a classification
cannot reveal “the true emotion behind any of the messages we collected”.
The fact that many unfairly treated recipients identified with selfish dictators,
which most likely led the evaluators to independently classify their messages
as neutral, does not necessarily imply that they did not experience a negative
emotion.18
4.5 Dictator behavior
We conclude this section by briefly reporting on the dictators’ behavior. First
we note that the percentage of selfish dictators in the MDG (65.8% across all
treatments) is higher compared to earlier studies of mini dictator games. Most
of these studies let the dictators choose between an equal split and a split that
is favorable to them, and find that about one quarter of the dictators behave
selfishly (see, e.g., Kahneman et al., 1986; Dana et al., 2007; or the survey by
17As suggested by an anonymous referee, a possible explanation for the difference in the
frequency of negative messages between MnB and MB is that the elicitation of beliefs in the
first PGG influences the emotional state of the unfairly treated recipients in a way that they
want to air more grievances against their dictator. Result 2 above hints at the possibility of
a relationship between belief elicitation and emotion.
18When we retest Question 2 considering the unfairly treated recipients who (i) self-reported
to have experienced a negative emotion upon learning the dictator’s decision and (ii) sent a
message whose content was classified as negative, the p-value of the one-sided Wilcoxon rank
sum test is 0.24 for CnB vs. MnB and 0.25 for CB vs. MB. This result is most likely
attributable to the small size of the subsample (14 observations for MnB and 18 for MB),
which may determine a low power of the test and make its result highly prone to a type II
error.
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Camerer, 2003, p. 56).19 Our result validates the choice of an allocation that is
slightly favoring the recipient—rather than the equal split—so as to tempt the
dictators with the selfish choice.
Table 2 and Figure C1 in the online supplement show that, in the treatments
without belief elicitation, there are fewer dictators choosing the selfish alloca-
tion when text messaging is permitted than when it is not permitted (58.2%
in MnB vs. 73.9% in CnB ). The difference in frequencies is significant at the
1% level (p-value = 0.01, test for equality of proportions). Conversely, in the
treatments with belief elicitation, the percentage of selfish choices by the dic-
tators is higher—though not significantly higher—in the presence than in the
absence of messaging opportunities (70.0% in MB vs. 61.0% in CB; p-value =
0.27, test for equality of proportions). Hence, our findings are consistent with
those of Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) and Xiao and Houser (2009) only
for the treatments without beliefs.
Turning to the analysis of the dictators’ contribution behavior, Table 2
reveals that, in all treatments, most of the selfish dictators (84.1% in CnB,
82.8% in MnB, 78.7% in CB, and 73.8% in MB) either do not modify or reduce
their contributions between the first and the second PGG. We note, however,
that PGG 2 contributions are significantly lower than PGG 1 contributions in
the control treatments (p-value < 0.01 for CnB and 0.06 for CB, Wilcoxon
signed rank test), but not in the treatments where selfish dictators receive
a message (the Wilcoxon signed rank test p-value is 0.22 for MnB and 0.56
for MB). This holds independently of whether the selfish dictators receive a
message classified as negative (p-value = 0.30 for MnB and 0.24 for MB) or a
message classified as either neutral or positive (the respective p-values are 0.54
and 0.96).
As regards generous dictators, Wilcoxon signed rank tests indicate that upon
receipt of a positive message they significantly increase their contributions (p-
value = 0.06 for MnB and 0.05 for MB).20 No significant difference between
PGG 1 and PGG 2 contributions is detected in the control treatments (p-value
= 0.75 for CnB and 0.69 for CB).
19Dana et al. (2007), for instance, in their baseline treatment give the dictators a choice
between an equal split of $10 and an unfair and welfare inefficient option yielding $6 to the
dictator and $1 to the recipient. They observe that merely 26% of the dictators choose the
unfair option.
20The reader is reminded that 98% (89%) of the messages written by recipients getting
e11 in MnB (MB) are classified as positive.
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5 Conclusions
Numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that emotions
play a part in decision-making. Laboratory research has also documented that,
within a given environment (usually an ultimatum or a public goods game),
symbolic non-monetary punishment serves as a deterrent to costly and ineffi-
cient actions. What is novel in the present paper is that we link the experienc-
ing of negative emotions and the presence of communication opportunities in
one game to behavior in a subsequent game. Practically speaking, we test for
spillover effects.
The contribution rates of the recipients of an unfair offer show clear signs of
dropping off both in the presence and in the absence of communication oppor-
tunities. This is reminiscent of the results of Houser et al. (2012), who found
that people reporting to have been unfairly treated in a dictator game were
more likely to cheat in a subsequent coin flip experiment. In both their ex-
periment and ours, the experience of unfair treatment reduces the participants’
willingness to act pro-socially.
Although we showed that the subsequent lower contributions of the unfairly
treated recipients cannot be attributed to learning,21 it could be explained in
terms of conditional cooperation as the changes in contributions are found to
be positively correlated with the changes in stated beliefs. More specifically,
players who receive a small offer in the dictator game lower their beliefs about
the other’s contribution and become less cooperative in the future.
With respect to the entire sample of unfairly treated recipients, we find
evidence of the spillover effects of messaging opportunities only when beliefs
are not elicited: in the treatments with belief elicitation, the unfairly treated
recipients who have the possibility of sending a message to the dictator do not
reduce their subsequent contributions significantly less in comparison with the
unfairly treated recipients who do not have such a possibility. This result may
be attributable to the fact that, in the case of belief elicitation, the percentage
of unfairly treated recipients who do not change or even increase their contri-
butions is higher in the control (47%) than in the message treatment (36%).
When we restrict our sample to the unfairly treated recipients who actu-
ally reduce their contributions from the first to the second public goods game,
then we observe that the presence of messaging opportunities leads to the cur-
21If players had a better understanding of the dominant strategy while playing the second
public goods game, then the decrease in contributions should be universal to them all. We
observed, instead, that the recipients getting e11 contribute, on average, more in the second
public goods game than in the first one.
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tailment of contribution cuts in all treatments, those with and without belief
elicitation. As stated elsewhere in the paper, in comparison with the unfairly
treated recipients who—in the absence of communication opportunities—do
not change or even increase their contributions, the unfairly treated recipients
who reduce their contributions may be more appreciative of the introduction of
communication channels.
As to the mechanism accounting for the spillover effects of messaging op-
portunities, our data do not support the hypothesis that the observed smaller
reductions in contributions are driven by conditionally cooperative recipients
who expect their partners to contribute more following the receipt of their mes-
sage. Having formed a negative perception of the partner, the unfairly treated
recipients are left with no faith on a written message as corrective action. The
finding that the reductions in contributions, but not in beliefs, are smaller in
the treatments with messaging opportunities than in the control treatments
indicates that people inherently value the chance to express their opinions (as
claimed by, e.g., Katz, 1960; Ong et al., 2012), though the content of the mes-
sages was not always classified as conveying negative emotions.
An important lesson to be learned from our experiment is that eliciting
incentivized beliefs (which is known to affect contribution decisions) appears
to influence the emotional state of the unfairly treated recipients. Messaging
opportunities become less important to them. In other words, despite the ab-
sence of messaging opportunities the unfairly treated recipients are less likely
to reduce their subsequent contributions. While the data presented here do not
allow us to ascertain the source of the relationship between belief elicitation
and relief of negative emotions, they do suggest that the elicitation of beliefs is
related to emotions in some way.
As a final remark, we employed a computer-mediated communication mode
to isolate the impact of written emotional expressions from visual and ver-
bal stimuli. Given this setting, the question arises as to whether our findings
generalize to situations where emotions can be expressed verbally or through
gestures. Further research is needed to explore this issue as well as the mecha-
nisms linking belief elicitation to the relief of negative feelings.
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